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1 Introduction
What drives unemployment uctuations at business cycle frequencies? Since the seminal work
of Mortensen-Pissarides (1994), a vast literature has focused on labor productivity to explain
movements in unemployment.1 In a Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) search and matching model,
an increase in productivity raises the surplus of a match between a rm and a worker, leads
rms to post more job vacancies and pulls down the unemployment rate. Shifts in labor
demand are caused by changes in productivity, and productivity is seen as the central driving
force of unemployment uctuations.
Given the major role played by productivity, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence
on the impact of productivity changes on unemployment. In fact, this paper uncovers new
empirical ndings that are inconsistent with the standard MP prediction that an increase in
productivity leads to lower unemployment. I argue that the inconsistency arises because the
MP model does not allow output to be demand determined in the short run, and I present a
search model with costly price adjustment that can rationalize the empirical observations.
The rst contribution of this paper is empirical. I provide a thorough study of the re-
lationship between unemployment uctuations and di¤erent measures of productivity in the
US, and I highlight new empirical facts that posit a challenge to the standard MP model. I
nd that , the contemporaneous correlation between labor productivity and unemployment
displays a large and swift increase in the mid 80s; from negative it became positive during the
Great Moderation.2 Furthermore, I use long run identifying restrictions to decompose labor
productivity and unemployment into technology shocks and non-technology shocks. I nd that
a positive technology shock, identied as the only disturbance with a permanent impact on
labor productivity, increases unemployment temporarily, whereas a positive non-technology
shock (temporarily) increases productivity and decreases unemployment.
The standard search model of unemployment is confronted with two problems. First, it
predicts that an increase in productivity leads to lower unemployment and implies a negative
value for : Second, with only one mechanism through which productivity a¤ects the labor
market, it cannot generate two di¤erent impulse responses or explain large uctuations of .
The second contribution of this paper is theoretical. I extend the MP model by introducing
nominal frictions so that hiring rms are demand constrained in a New-Keynesian fashion. I
also make a crucial distinction between the extensive (number of workers) and the intensive
(hours and e¤ort) labor margins. In this framework, unemployment uctuations are the prod-
1See, among others, Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), Shimer (2005a),
Hall (2005) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2005).
2The so-called "Great Moderation" refers to the dramatic decline in macroeconomic volatility enjoyed by
the US economy since the mid 80s. (see, for example, McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000)
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uct of two disturbances: technology shocks and monetary policy (or aggregate demand) shocks.
Positive technology shocks temporarily raise unemployment because with sticky prices, aggre-
gate demand does not adjust immediately to the new productivity level, and rms use less
labor. The correlation between unemployment and productivity, , is positive. In contrast,
positive aggregate demand disturbances decrease unemployment and increase productivity
temporarily, because rms increase labor e¤ort to satisfy demand in the short run. As a result,
 is negative. In this model, movements in  reect changes in the relative importance (or
volatility) of technology and aggregate demand shocks.
The volatility of the non-technology shocks identied with long run restrictions displays
a large drop in the early 80s. By interpreting non-technology shocks as aggregate demand
shocks in the model, this can explain why  increased. Furthermore, it can be argued that a
structural change took place in the early 80s. Notably, productivity became less procyclical,
i.e. the endogenous component of productivity due to variable capacity utilization of inputs
decreased. With a less endogenous response of productivity, the negative impact that aggregate
demand shocks have on  is diminished. This can also explain why  increased. I simulate the
impact of the simultaneous structural change and drop in the volatility of aggregate demand
shocks, and I nd that these two events can quantitatively explain the sign switch of  that took
place in the mid 80s. A remaining question is why productivity became less procyclical after
the mid 80s, and I discuss an explanation emphasizing a change in the behavior of inventories
after 1984.3
The seminal contributions of Galí (1999) and Basu, Fernald and Kimball (1999) spawned an
important empirical literature on the negative e¤ect of technology shocks on total hours worked,
but the focus has mostly been on hours and not employment or unemployment. Galí (1999)
o¤ered a New-Keynesian explanation, and the present model invokes a similar mechanism to
account for an increase in unemployment following a technology shock. A few papers introduce
search models of unemployment into New-Keynesian frameworks but to my knowledge, this
paper is the rst to propose a model emphasizing the interaction between hiring frictions and
nominal frictions and capable of rationalizing large movements in . Models in the spirit of
Trigari (2004) or Walsh (2004) introduce a separation between rms facing price stickiness (the
retail sector) and rms evolving in a MP labor market without nominal rigidities (the wholesale
sector). Firms responsible for employment are never demand constrained; adjustments occur
through prices, not quantities, and the correlation between productivity and unemployment is
counterfactually negative for technology shocks. In Krause and Lubik (2003), hiring rms are
demand constrained, but without intensive margin, the model cannot generate any endogenous
movement in productivity. Finally, in a recent paper written in parallel to the present one,
3See Blanchard and Simon (2001), Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002) and Ramey and Vine (2004).
3
Blanchard and Galí (2006) present a model similar in spirit but focus on the consequence of
hiring frictions on optimal monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 studies the relationship
between labor productivity and unemployment; Section 3 presents a New-Keynesian model
with search unemployment; Section 4 describes the equilibrium and dynamics of the model;
Section 5 confronts the model with the data; and Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
This section documents empirical ndings that pose a challenge to the current search theory of
unemployment uctuations but also guide the formulation of a consistent model. First, I study
the joint behavior of productivity and unemployment and show that their contemporaneous
correlation  changed sign in the mid 80s. Second, I use long run identifying restrictions to
decompose labor productivity and unemployment into technology shocks and non-technology
shocks. I confront the standard MP model with this evidence and argue that it cannot, as
such, account for the behavior of cyclical unemployment in the US. I conclude that a theory of
unemployment uctuations should explicitly consider the interaction of technology and non-
technology shocks.
2.1 The  puzzle
Figure 1 shows the detrended series for US unemployment and labor productivity (i.e. out-
put per hour) over 1948-2005.4 Until 1985, the two series seem negatively correlated with
unemployment lagging labor productivity. After 1985 however, the correlation becomes posi-
tive. This is especially true for 1993 when both unemployment and labor productivity increase
sharply but this is apparent throughout the post-1985 period. The magnitude of this sign ip is
large: looking at Table 2-1,  goes from  0:31 over 1948-1984 to 0:40 over 1985-2005, and both
estimates are signicant at the 5%-level.5 To see more sharply this change in the correlation,
Figure 2 plots 10, the 10-year rolling contemporaneous correlation between unemployment
and labor productivity. In about a years time, the rolling correlation switches swiftly from
4The data are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and cover the period 1948:Q1 through
2005:Q4. Labor productivity is measured as real average output per hour in the non-farm business sector
and unemployment is the quarterly average of the monthly unemployment rate series constructed by the BLS
from the Current Population Survey. All series are expressed as deviations from an HP-lter with smoothing
parameter 1600. The conclusions are independent of the smoothing parameter.
5Gali and Gambetti (2007), in recent work conducted independently, stress that the correlation of hours with
labor productivity experienced a remarkable decline, shifting from values close to zero in the pre-84 period to
large negative values after 1984.
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negative to positive values. But 10 also displays large uctuations throughout the whole pe-
riod, and before 1984, 10 deviates sometimes by 50% from its 1948-1984 mean. Although I
so far only considered the contemporaneous correlation, a quick look at the unemployment-
productivity cross-correlogram before and after 1985 gives the same conclusion. As we can see
on Figure 3, the two cross-correlograms look dramatically di¤erent. Notably, the correlation
between unemployment and labor productivity lagged two-quarters is positive after 1985 but
corresponds to the peak negative correlation before 1985.
As a robustness check, I verify that the swift jump of  is not the result of a change in
the denition of unemployment or the labor force, and in Figure 4 and 5, I plot respectively
the 10-year rolling correlation between employment (in millions) and output per hour and the
10-year rolling correlation between vacancies and output per hour.6 Both display a large
jump similar to . Table 2-1 conrms this result as the correlation between productivity and
vacancies went from 0:34 over 1951-1984 to  0:18 over 1985-2005.
Finally, I consider an alternative measure of productivity. Chang and Hong (2006) argue
that TFP is a more natural measure of technology than output per hour because the latter
also reects changes in input mix as well as improved e¢ ciency. Figure 6 plots the 10-year
rolling correlation between unemployment and TFP adjusted for capacity utilization.7 The
correlation is never strongly negative but oscillates between positive and negative values until
the mid-80s. However, its evolution resembles the evolution of , and one can observe a similar
jump in the mid-80s.
2.2 The impact of technology shocks on unemployment
There is little empirical evidence on the impact of productivity movements on cyclical unem-
ployment. Galí (1999) and Basu, Fernald and Kimball (1999) spawned an important empirical
literature on the negative e¤ect of technology shocks on total hours worked but the issue has
almost never been studied in the context of unemployment models.8
Galí (1999), following the seminal work by Blanchard and Quah (1989), proposed a method
to identify technological disturbances. By imposing long run restrictions, it is possible to isolate
technology shocks and study their impact on the economy. Technology shocks are identied
as the only shocks with a permanent impact on productivity. Using a similar framework, I
6The employment series is the number of employed workers (in millions) in the non-farm business sector and
is taken from the BLS. The vacancy series is the Conference Board help advertising index. Both series cover
1951:Q1-2005:Q4 and are detrended with an HP-lter with smoothing parameter 1600:
7The TFP series is taken from Beaudry and Portier (2006) and covers 1948:Q1 to 2000:Q4.
8Two exceptions are Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2005) and Ravn (2005). Ravns (2005) impulse responses
are likely to be distorted because he does not remove the low-frequency movements in productivity and un-
employment that bias the estimates. Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2005) nd impulse responses similar to the
present paper but focus on the creative destruction aspect of technological progress.
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study the response of unemployment (instead of hours) to a technology shock. Specically, I
am interested in estimating the system 
xt
ut
!
= C(L)
 
"at
"mt
!
= C(L)"t (1)
where xt is labor productivity dened as output per hours, ut unemployment, C(L) an in-
vertible matrix polynomial and "t the vector of structural orthogonal innovations comprised of
"at technology shocks and "
m
t non-technology shocks. I use the estimation method of Shapiro
and Watson (1988) and Francis and Ramey (2003) to allow for time-varying variance of the
structural innovations. The details of the estimation are described in the Appendix.
I use quarterly data taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) covering the
period 1948:Q1 to 2005:Q4. Labor productivity xt is measured as real average output per hour
in the non-farm business sector, and unemployment ut is the quarterly average of the monthly
unemployment rate series constructed by the BLS from the Current Population Survey. Fol-
lowing Fernald (2005), I allow for two breaks in xt, 1973:Q1 and 1997:Q1, and I lter the
unemployment series with a quartic trend. Fernald (2005) showed that the presence of a low-
frequency correlation between labor productivity growth and unemployment, while unrelated
to cyclical phenomena, could signicantly distort the estimates of short run responses obtained
with long run restrictions.9
The rst row of Figure 7 displays the impulse response functions of productivity and un-
employment following a technology shock. Labor productivity undershoots its new long run
level by around 20% and plateaus after about one and a half years. After an initial jump,
unemployment displays a hump-shaped positive response that peaks quite rapidly, in about
2 quarters. Quantitatively, a 0.5% rise in productivity is associated with a 0.2 percentage
point increase in unemployment. The second row of Figure 7 shows the dynamic e¤ects of
a non-technology shock. On impact, productivity jumps by 0.6% and reverts to its long run
value in one year. Unemployment decreases, reaches a trough after one year, and reverts slowly
to its long run value. Quantitatively, a 0.6% increase in productivity is correlated with a 0.2
percentage point drop in unemployment.
As a robustness check, I now reproduce this exercise using the TFP series from Beaudry and
9At low frequencies, unemployment displays a low-high-low pattern. With high growth in the 60s followed
by a slowdown in the 70s and an acceleration in the late 90s, productivity growth displays a similar U-shape
trend. To get non-distorted impulse responses, I remove the low-frequency movement in productivity growth
and unemployment. An alternative proposed by Fernald (2005) would be to separately analyze subsamples with
no breaks in technology growth. In a robustness check, I restrict the sample period to 1973-1997 where there is
no clear trend break. Results remain very similar.
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Portier (2006) instead of output per hour in (1).10 Indeed, Chang and Hong (2006) question
Galis (1999) nding that technology shocks decrease total hours worked and attribute it to
the use of output per hour as a measure of productivity. They argue that, because output
per hour, unlike TFP, is inuenced by permanent shifts in input mix (e.g. shocks a¤ecting
permanently the capital-labor ratio), Gali (1999) mislabels changes in input mix as technology
shocks and does not properly identify the response of total hours worked to technology shocks.
My approach is obviously subject to the same criticism, and Figure 8 shows the impulse
response functions to technology and non-technology shocks using TFP unadjusted for capacity
utilization. Encouragingly, the impulse responses look very similar to the ones using output
per hour, and technology shocks increase unemployment temporarily. Using TFP adjusted
for capacity utilization, one can observe in Figure 9 that the unemployment responses are
unchanged but that, following a non-technology shock, the response of adjusted TFP is much
weaker and never signicant. Following a technology shock, adjusted TFP jumps immediately
to its long run value without any undershooting.
2.3 Confronting the MP model with the data
The standard search model with productivity shocks used in Mortensen-Pissarides (1994),
Shimer (2005a) or Hall (2005) is confronted with two problems. First, it predicts a negative
value for , as an increase in productivity raises the surplus of a match, leads rms to post more
vacancies and pulls down the unemployment rate. However,  is positive since the beginning
of the Great Moderation, and I nd that a positive technology shock increases unemployment
in the short run. Using TFP instead of output per hour as a measure of productivity gives an
even more puzzling result as the unemployment-TFP correlation is never signicantly negative
over the whole 1948-2005. Second, the standard MP model cannot account for changes in the
sign of  because it embeds only one mechanism through which productivity a¤ects the labor
market.
I now argue that the interaction of technology and non-technology shocks is key to under-
stand the behavior of .
10 In another robustness check, I follow Fisher (2006) and estimate a more general specication allowing for
two types of technology shocks: neutral technology shocks (N-shocks) and investment specic technology shocks
(I-shocks). Both shocks can have a permanent e¤ect on productivity but only I-shocks can a¤ect the price
of investment in the long-run. Using a trivariate VAR with the real price of equipment, output per hour and
unemployment, I nd that the Blanchard-Quah aggregation theorem holds because the responses of productivity
and unemployment to I-shocks resemble the responses to non-technology shocks. The results are available upon
request.
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2.4 Explaining the behavior of 
In order to identify the possible factors behind the large movements in the unemployment-
productivity correlation, I start by deriving an analytical expression for . Indeed, when xt
and ut are represented by (1), they can be rewritten as
xt =
1X
j=0
Cx1j "
a
t j +
1X
j=0
Cx2j "
m
t j
ut =
1X
j=0
Cu1j"
a
t j +
1X
j=0
Cu2j"
m
t j
so that I can write  as
 =
2a
1P
j=0
Cx1jC
u
1j + 
2
m
1P
j=0
Cx2jC
u
2js
2a
1P
j=0

Cx1j
2
+ 2m
1P
j=0

Cx2j
2s
2a
1P
j=0

Cu1j
2
+ 2m
1P
j=0

Cu2j
2 (2)
where Cx1j =
jP
i=0
Cx1i and C
x
2j =
jP
i=0
Cx2i .
This expression shows that  depends on the variances of the two shocks hitting the econ-
omy 2a and 
2
m but also on the polynomial coe¢ cients capturing the dynamic responses of
unemployment and productivity to these shocks. Hence, in the context of the specication from
Section 2.2, there are two (non-exclusive) explanations for a change in the sign of the correla-
tion: (a) a change in the relative importance (or volatility) of technology and non-technology
shocks and (b) a structural change in the transmission mechanism of these shocks.
Further, I can use (2) to make an educated guess about the reasons behind the large
increase in : Looking at the impulse responses from Section 2.2, I can reasonably assume
that, up to a good approximation, Cx1j  0; Cu1j  0; Cx2j  0 and Cu2j  0; 8 j  0: Hence, for
the unemployment-productivity covariance (the numerator of ) to increase dramatically and
change sign, at least one of two things must happen: either 2a increases and/or 
2
m decreases,
i.e. technology shocks become bigger relative to non-technology shocks, or Cx1j and C
u
1j increase
and/or Cx2j and C
u
2j decrease. I explore these two possibilities successively.
2.4.1 A change in the volatility of shocks
Since technology and non-technology shocks generate opposite comovements of unemployment
and productivity,  will depend on their relative strength. If one type of shock became more
importantthan the other, the resulting correlation could theoretically switch between pos-
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itive and negative values. For example, smaller non-technology shocks or larger technology
shocks would increase . Figure 10 shows the 5-year rolling standard deviations of technology
and non-technology shocks previously identied. Although the variances of both shocks display
a downward trend, it is more pronounced for non-technology shocks with a large drop in the
mid 80s.11 The standard deviation of non-technology shocks decreased by more than 200%
while the standard deviation of technology shocks was roughly constant in the mid 80s. Was
the sign switch of  caused by a large decrease in the volatility of all shocks except for techno-
logical shocks? In Figure 11, I plot simultaneously 5, the 5-year rolling correlation between
unemployment and labor productivity, and the ratio of the 5-year rolling standard deviation of
technology shocks to the 5-year rolling standard deviation of non-technology shocks. The result
is striking: the two series look very similar despite di¤erent construction methods. Moreover,
5 lags the shock series by about a year, suggesting a causal role for volatility uctuations and
an explanation for the sign ip of .
2.4.2 Structural changes
Signicant changes occurred in the early- to mid 80s since the beginning of the Great Moder-
ation: a change in the conduct of monetary policy, a change in inventory management and a
change in the regulatory environment.12 Analyzing the response of total hours worked to tech-
nology shocks, Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2003) and Fisher (2006) split their data sample
in two sub-periods and report very di¤erent impulse response functions for each sub-period.
To allow for a structural change, I also split the sample in two sub-periods, 1948-1983 and
1984-2005, and Figure 12 shows the impulse responses obtained for each period. The responses
di¤er in two points: (a) technology shocks have a smaller impact on unemployment after 1984,
and (b) non-technology shocks have a smaller impact on labor productivity after 1984.
Better monetary policy and the response of unemployment to technology shocks:
Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2003) argue that the Feds response to technology shocks signi-
cantly changed after 1982, and that it tended to over-stabilize output in the pre-Volcker/Greenspan
era. Figure 12 conrms this nding with a smaller and less signicant response of unemploy-
ment after 1984 that can be attributed to an improvement in monetary policy.13 Looking at
11The nding that the volatility of shocks decreased since the mid-80s is not new. Stock and Watson (2002,
2003) argue that smaller shocks may be responsible for half or more of the great moderation, a decline in the
cyclical volatility of output and ination since 1984.
12See, for example, Stock and Watson (2002, 2003).
13Gali, Lopez-Salido and Vallés (2003) removed the 1979:Q3-1982:Q2 period from their sample because of the
unusual monetary operating procedures that were e¤ective. Since my original impulse response functions were
obtained using the whole sample of data, I do not remove that particular period from the sub-sample for ease
of comparison.
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(2), the improvement in the conduct of monetary policy decreases Cu1j which tends to decrease
the unemployment-productivity covariance. However, since the denominator of  increases
when Cu1j decreases, the improvement in the conduct of monetary policy has an ambiguous
e¤ect on . As a result, this structural change does not appear to be the main reason for the
large and swift increase in :
A decline in the procyclicality of productivity: As we can see in Figure 12, produc-
tivity is less responsive after 1984. Following the same aggregate demand shock, productivity
responds almost half as much after 1984 with the response on impact going from 0:82 to 0:44
and becoming non signicant at the 10% level after 1984. The responses for unemployment,
on the other hand, are comparable. A lower endogenous response of productivity for the same
response in unemployment tends to decrease the negative impact that a demand shock has
on . Looking at (2), this decline in the procyclicality of measured labor productivity corre-
sponds to a decline in Cx2j which increases  as the nominator increases while the denominator
decreases.
This evidence indicates that the interaction of technology and non-technology shocks plays
an important role in explaining unemployment uctuations and productivity movements. I in-
terpret non-technology shocks as aggregate demand shocks, and I now present a New-Keynesian
model with search unemployment.14
3 A New-Keynesian model with search unemployment
To account for the conicting evidence, I depart from the standard MP framework by allowing
output to be demand determined in the short run. Firms need to meet the demand for their
product at all time, and to do that, I assume that they can adjust the quantity of inputs used
but also their level of capacity utilization. In this framework, a positive technology shock may
temporarily raise unemployment if aggregate demand does not adjust immediately to the new
productivity level (e.g. because of nominal rigidities). When productivity increases faster than
aggregate demand, rms need less labor and decrease their level of employment as well as their
capacity utilization of labor. In contrast, a positive aggregate demand disturbance decreases
unemployment and increases productivity temporarily because rms increase their capacity
utilization of inputs in order to satisfy demand in the short run.15
14An alternative interpretation could ignore aggregate demand altogether and emphasize di¤erent types of
technology shocks. I defer a discussion of this interpretation to Section 6.
15Note that this transmission mechanism is supported by the evidence presented in Section 2. If variations in
the degree of capacity utilization of inputs are behind the movements in labor productivity reported in Figure
10
I now present a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition in the goods
market, hiring frictions in the labor market and nominal price rigidities. I also make a dis-
tinction between the extensive (number of workers) and the intensive (hours and e¤ort) labor
margins. There are three types of agents: households, rms and a monetary authority. In this
framework, unemployment uctuations and productivity movements are the product of two
disturbances: technology shocks and monetary policy (i.e. aggregate demand) shocks.
3.1 Households
I consider an economy populated by a continuum of households of measure one. With equi-
librium unemployment, ex-ante homogenous workers become heterogeneous in the absence of
perfect income insurance because each individuals wealth di¤ers based on his employment
history. To avoid distributional issues, I follow Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) in assuming
that households are extended families that pool their income and choose per capita consump-
tion and assets holding to maximize their expected lifetime utility. Moreover, I assume that
the family employment rate is equal to the aggregate employment rate nt. In order to gener-
ate endogenous productivity, each employed family member supplies hours ht and e¤ort per
hour et to the rm. Employed workers receive the wage payment wthtet with wt the wage per
e¢ ciency unit, and unemployed workers receive unemployment benets bt = bAt with At the
aggregate technology index. Unemployment benets are taken as given by workers and rms.
Denoting g(ht; et) the individual disutility from working, the representative family seeks to
maximize
E0
1X
t=0
t

ln (Ct) + m ln(
Mt
Pt
)  ntg(ht; et)

subject to the budget constraintZ 1
0
PitCitdi+Mt +Bt = ntwthtet + (1  nt)bt +Mt 1 + (1 + it 1)Bt 1 +t + Tt
with m a positive constant, Mt nominal money holdings, Bt bonds holdings paying an in-
terest rate it, t aggregate prots, Tt transfers from the government and Ct the composite
consumption good index dened by
Ct =
Z 1
0
C
" 1
"
it di
 "
" 1
7, the endogenous response of productivity should vanish when one uses TFP adjusted for capacity utilization.
As Figure 9 shows, this is exactly what happens. This result is also interesting in the context of the literature
spawned by Gali (1999) on the e¤ect of technology shocks on total hours worked. To my knowledge, it is the
rst time that Galis crucial assumption of varying capacity utilization receives direct empirical support.
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where Cit is the quantity of good i 2 [0; 1] consumed in period t and Pit is the price of variety
i: " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among consumption goods. The aggregate price level is
dened as Pt =
0@ 1Z
0
P 1 "it
1A
1
1 "
. The disutility from supplying hours of work ht and e¤ort per
hour et is the sum of the disutilities of the members who are employed. The individual period
disutility of labor takes the form:
g(ht; et) =
h
1 + h
h1+ht + ht
e
1 + e
e1+et
where h; e; h and e are positive constants.16 The last term reects disutility from exerting
e¤ort with the marginal disutility of e¤ort per hour rising with the number of hours. An innite
value for e generates the standard case with inelastic e¤ort.
3.2 Firms and the labor market
Each di¤erentiated good is produced by a monopolistically competitive rm using labor as the
only input. There is a continuum of large rms distributed on the unit interval. At date t,
each rm i hires nit workers to produce a quantity
yit = AtnitL

it (3)
where At is an aggregate technology index, Lit the e¤ective labor input supplied by each worker
and 0 <  < 1.17 I dene e¤ective labor input as a function of hours hit and e¤ort per hour
eit:
Lit = hiteit. (4)
Total e¤ective labor input can be adjusted through three channels: the extensive margin nit,
and the two intensive margins: hours hit and e¤ort per hour eit. The latter a¤ects output per
hour, i.e. labor productivity. Being a monopolistic producer, the rm faces a downward sloping
demand curve ydit = (
Pit
Pt
) "Yt and chooses its price Pit to maximize its value function given
the aggregate price level Pt and aggregate output Yt. When changing their price, rms face
quadratic adjustment costs 2

Pi;t
Pi;t 1   

with  a positive constant and  the steady-state
level of ination.18
16Bils and Cho (1994) use a similar disutility of working to introduce cyclical uctuations in e¤ective hours.
17The model does not explicitly consider capital for tractability reasons but (3) can be rationalized by assuming
a constant capital-worker ratio and a standard Cobb-Douglas production function yit = At (nLit)
K1 it .
18A more common approach in New-Keynesian models is the assumption of Calvo-type price setting in which
rms can only reset their price at random dates. However, the fact that a fraction of randomly selected
rms cannot reset its price each period introduces heterogeneity amongst rms. This complicates greatly the
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In a search and matching model of the labor market, workers cannot be hired instanta-
neously and must be hired from the unemployment pool through a costly and time-consuming
job creation process. Firms post vacancies at a unitary cost, ct = cAt, and unemployed work-
ers search for jobs. Vacancies are matched to searching workers at a rate that depends on the
number of searchers on each side of the market. I assume that the matching function takes the
usual Cobb-Douglas form so that the ow mt of successful matches within period t is given by
mt = m0u

t v
1 
t
where m0 is a positive constant,  2 (0; 1), ut denotes the number of unemployed and
vt=
R 1
0 vitdi the total number of vacancies posted by all rms. Accordingly, the probability
of a vacancy being lled in the next period is q(t)  m(ut; vt)=vt = m0  where t  vtut
is the labor market tightness. Similarly, the probability for an unemployed to nd a job is
m(ut; vt)=ut = m0
1 
t . Matches are destroyed at an exogenous rate .
Because of hiring frictions, a match formed at t will only start producing at t+ 1, i.e. nit
the employment of rm i at date t is a state variable.19 For a rm posting vit vacancies at
date t, the law of motion for its employment is given by
nit+1 = (1  )nit + q(t)vi;t.
Finally, rm is cost function, it, is the sum of wage payments to employees and vacancy
posting costs
it = nithiteitwit + ctvit:
3.3 Hours/e¤ort decision and procyclical productivity
When a rm and a worker meet, they must decide on the allocation of hours and e¤ort to
satisfy demand. I assume that both parties negotiate the hours/e¤ort decision by choosing the
optimal allocation. More precisely, they solve
min
hit;eit
h
1 + h
h1+hit + hit
e
1 + e
e1+eit (5)
integration of price setting decisions, wage bargainings and hiring decisions. In the Appendix, I present the
model with Calvo-type price setting, and I show that its implications are similar to the one with costly price
adjustment. Apart from the behavior of the equilibrium real wage, both models imply the same rst-order
conditions and the same New-Keynesian Phillips curve.
19The reader might question this assumption given that the average life of a vacancy is less than one month
in the US. However, adding a fully operational worker to the production chain involves not only lling up the
vacancy but also training. The rm could certainly not increase its production immediately, should it rely only
on the extensive margin. Treating employment as a state variable is a way to model this rigidity.
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subject to satisfying demand Atnithite

it = y
d
it at date t. The rm and the worker choose hours
and e¤ort per hour to satisfy demand at the lowest utility cost for the worker.
The rst-order conditions imply that e¤ort per hour is a function of total hours
eit = e0h
h
1+e
it (6)
where e0 =

1+e
e
h
e
 1
1+e is a positive constant. Thus, changes in hours can proxy for changes
in e¤ort, and I can write a reduced-form relationship between output and hours:
yit = y0Atnith
'
it
with y0 = e0 and ' = 

1 + h1+e

.
For ' > 1, the production function displays short run increasing returns to hours. In times
of higher demand, rms respond by increasing hours and e¤ort, which increases output per
hour, i.e. measured labor productivity. This condition is critical to generate the procyclical
response of measured productivity to aggregate demand shocks. It holds with su¢ ciently high
marginal product of e¢ cient hour (high ) or high e¤ort elasticity with respect to hours (high
h
1+e
), and from now on, I assume that the models parameters ensure ' > 1.
With short run increasing returns to hours but constant returns to employment, one may
wonder why a demand constrained rm would ever want to hire an extra worker. However,
rewriting the rms cost function with (6), we can see that the cost of extra hours and e¤ort
increases even faster than output since it = wit:e0h
1+
h
1+e
it nit + ctvit and 1 +
h
1+e
> ' =


1 + h1+e

. For a given level of employment, the cost of satisfying demand ydit with the
intensive margin is given by
it = wit

ydit
At
 
n1  it + ctvit
where  = 1 > 1. Hence, absent hiring frictions, the rm would actually rather hire an
extra worker than use the intensive margin because the cost of longer hours and higher e¤ort
increases faster than output. But because employment is a state variable and is costly to
adjust, the rm must also rely on the intensive margin to satisfy demand. This property of
the model captures the fact that the intensive margin is more exible than the extensive one,
but that this exibility comes at a higher cost. Although it is easier to increase the workload of
an employee than to hire and train a new one, overtime hours are more expensive than regular
ones.
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3.4 Wage bill setting
The discussion has so far left the wage unspecied. In the standard MP model, each rm-worker
pair bargains over the rent of the match and the outcome maximizes the weighted product of
the partiessurpluses. Here, I depart from the match-specic wage inherent to search models
and assume instead that rms take the market wage as given so that wit = wt.20 How is
this market wage determined? Denoting J(wt) the value of a matched worker to the rm and
W (wt) and U(wt) the value for a worker of being respectively employed and unemployed, any
wage satisfying W (wt)   U(wt) > 0 and J(wt) > 0 (i.e. within the bargaining set) can be
an equilibrium. I assume that the equilibrium real wage is determined by Nash-bargaining
between a representative rm and a representative worker.
If  is the bargaining power of the worker, the Nash-bargained wage of the representative
match takes the form
wnbt hiteit = 

Pit
Pt
yit
nit
+ ctt

+ (1  )

bt + g0yth
1+h
it

(7)
with g0 =
h
1+h
+ e1+e e
1+e
0 :
3.5 The rms problem
Given the market wage and aggregate price level, rm i will choose a sequence of price fPitg
and vacancies fvitg to maximize the expected present discounted value of future prots subject
to the demand constraint, the hours/e¤ort choice and the law of motion for employment.
Formally, the rm maximizes its value
Et
X
j
j
u0(Ct+j)
u0(Ct)
"
Pi;t+j
Pt+j
ydi;t+j   ni;t+jhi;t+jei;t+jwt   cAtvi;t+j  

2

Pi;t+j
Pi;t+j 1
  
2
Yt
#
subject to the hours/e¤ort decision
eit = e0h
h
1+e
it
the demand constraint
ydit = Atnith
'
it = (
Pi;t
Pt
) "Yt
20 In the benchmark MP search model with Nash bargaining, market wage and match-specic wage coincide.
This happens because a constant marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor is assumed. As
a result a single rm can never inuence the wage and takes it as given. On the other hand, with non-linear
preferences, rmshiring decisions depend on the wage as well as their hours/e¤ort level which itself inuences
the Nash bargained wage. This additional channel complicates the analysis and I shut it down by assuming
that rms take the wage as given.
15
and the law of motion for employment
nit+1 = (1  )nit + q(t)vit:
The optimal vacancy posting condition takes the form
ct
q(t)
= Ett+1

it+1 +
ct+1
q(t+1)
(1  )

(8)
where t+1 = 
u0(Ct+1)
u0(Ct) is the stochastic discount factor, and it, the shadow value of a marginal
worker, can be written as
it =  
@it
@nit
= (   1)wthiteit = (   1)wt

ydit
Atnit
 
.
Since 1q(t) is the expected duration of a vacancy, equation (8) has an intuitive interpretation:
each rm posts vacancies until the expected cost of hiring a worker Atcq(t) equals the expected
discounted future benets

it+j
	1
j=1
from an extra worker. Because the rm is demand
constrained, the ow value of a marginal worker is not his contribution to revenue but his
reduction of the rms wage bill. The rst term of it+1,  wt+1hit+1eit+1, represents the next-
period savings due to the decrease in hours and e¤ort achieved with an extra worker, while
the second term  wt+1hit+1eit+1 is the wage payment going to that extra worker. Because
 > 1, it+1 > 0 and the marginal worker always reduces the cost of satisfying a given level of
demand.21 Similarly to Woodfords (2004) New-Keynesian model with endogenous capital, the
marginal contribution of an additional worker is to reduce the wage bill through substitution of
one input for another. Here, the intensive and the extensive margins are two di¤erent inputs.
The former is exible but costly, while the latter takes time and resources to adjust. The rm
chooses the combination of labor margins that minimizes the cost of supplying the required
amount of output.
Turning to the optimal price setting rule, a rm resetting its price at date t will satisfy the
rst-order condition:
(1  ")yit
Pt
  " yit
Pit
sit    yt
Pit 1

Pit
Pit 1
  

= Ett+1yt+1 (t+1   )
Pit+1
P 2it
(9)
21Note that  > 1 is a necessary condition to ensure the existence of an equilibrium with non-zero employment.
For a su¢ ciently low level of employment, the (positive) value of a marginal worker becomes higher than the
cost of a vacancy and rms start hiring.
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where the rms real marginal cost sit is given by
sit =
@it
@yit
=  
wt
At

ydit
Atnit
  1
(10)
With  > 1, the real marginal cost increases with demand but decreases with the em-
ployment level. As a result, rms can lower the impact of shocks on their real marginal cost
and optimal price by adjusting their extensive margin nit. Ination will be less responsive to
shocks than in a standard New-Keynesian model without unemployment but will display more
persistence. This inertia arises not only because unemployment is itself a slow moving variable
but also because the rms real marginal cost is decreasing in its own employment. Following
an increase in demand, the value of a marginal worker goes up and leads the rm to increase
its level of employment. But this decreases future real marginal cost and leads the rm to post
lower prices, which itself increases demand and output next period. This in turn leads to a
future rise in employment, and, as the process goes on, the response to a demand shock will
die out more slowly than in the standard New-Keynesian case.
Finally, since rms are homogenous, in equilibrium Pit = Pt and yit = yt so that I can drop
the i index and rewrite (9) as the standard price-setting condition for New-Keynesian models
with quadratic price adjustment
1  t (t   ) + Ett+1
yt+1
yt
(t+1   )t+1 = " (1  st) (11)
In steady state, when ination t = , (11) collapses to st = " 1" the inverse of the mark-up
 = "" 1 .
3.6 Technological progress and the central bank
In order to be consistent with the long run identifying assumption made in Section 2, the
technology index series should be non-stationary with a unit root originating in technological
innovations. Hence, I assume that technology is comprised of a deterministic and a stochastic
component: At = At ~At with
At
At 1
= ea and ~At = eat with at = at 1 + "at . "at is a technology
shock with a permanent impact on productivity.
Consistent with a growing economy and zero ination in "steady-state", the quantity of
money M s evolves according to Mt = Mt ~Mt with
Mt
Mt 1
= ea and ~Mt = emt with mt =
mmt 1 + "mt +  cb"at , m 2 [0; 1] : I interpret "mt as a demand shock. With  cb 6= 0, the
monetary authority is assumed to respond in a systematic fashion to a technology shock.22
22The reader may wonder why I do not use a Taylor rule it = t + y(yt   yflext ) with yt   yflext the
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As in Gali (1999), the degree of monetary accommodation plays a key role as it determines
the response of unemployment to technology shocks. Following a positive technology shock, if
monetary policy is not too accommodating ( cb < 1), the price level has to decrease su¢ ciently
in order to bring aggregate demand in line with the new productivity level. But with costly
price adjustment this may be too expensive, and aggregate demand is sticky in the short run.
Being more productive, each rm meets its demand by using less labor, and unemployment
will increase.
3.7 Closing the model
Since rms are homogenous, in equilibrium nit = nt, Pit = Pt and yit = yt so that I can
drop the i index from all the equations. As a result, total employment evolves according to
nt+1 = (1 )nt+vtq(t): The labor force being normalized to one, the number of unemployed
workers is ut = 1   nt. Finally, assuming that vacancy posting costs are distributed to the
aggregate households, Ct = Yt in equilibrium.
4 Equilibrium and dynamics
I now present and study the equations governing the behavior of the model economy. First, I
characterize the long run equilibrium (or steady-state) of the model economy. Second, I argue
that the model needs a degree of real wage rigidity for it to be consistent with the predictions
of the standard MP model. Then, I present the log-linearized equations governing the model
around the (zero-ination) long-run equilibrium. Finally, because some equations are di¢ cult
to interpret, in the last subsection, I make a number of simplifying assumptions that allow me
to derive closed-form solutions and study the properties of the model.
4.1 Long-run equilibrium of the model economy
In this non-stationary economy, I rescale the non-stationary variables with the technology
index At: Absent nominal rigidities, money is neutral and the only disturbances of interest are
technology shocks. Since vacancy posting costs and unemployment benets are proportional to
"New-Keynesian" output gap dened as the deviation from yflext , the ouput under exible prices. However,
as Gali and Rabanal (2004) point out, this ouput gap is di¢ cult to observe for the policy maker. In fact, the
Taylor rule originally proposed by Taylor (1993) is it = t+y(yt  yt) in which the central bank responds to
the output gap dened as the deviation from some trend yt. However, it is not clear how one should model this
trend, and I keep the model relatively simple with a money growth rule. In addition, these two di¤erent Taylor
rules have very di¤erent implications in terms of stabilization of output. In response to technology shocks, the
rst rule implies an accomodating policy whereas the second rule implies the opposite. With a money growth
rule, I can let the data decide whether the central bank in fact accomodates, or not, technology shocks.
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the technology index, it is easy to see from (7) that the Nash-bargaining wage is proportional
to At. As a result, I can write wnbt = w
At where wAt is the Nash-bargained real wage in the
frictionless (zero-ination) economy. Denoting rescaled variables with lower-case letters, the
economy is described by the following system with 6 equations and 6 unknowns , y, h, e,
n and w:
y =

Yt
At

= y0n
h'
e = e0 (h)
h
1+e
c
q()
(1  (1  )) =  = whe (   1)
whe = 

y
n
+ c

+ (1  )  b+ g0yh1+h
1 =  w
hen
y
n =
q()
+ q()
where y0 and e0 are positive constants dened previously.23
The wage being proportional to the level of technology, a technology shock will have no impact
on market tightness or the level of unemployment. The equilibrium level of unemployment
1   n depends only on constant parameters of the model. This non-stationary equilibrium
describes the economy in the long run, when all price and wage variables have adjusted to
shocks.
4.2 The need for real wage rigidity
When prices are fully exible (i.e. costless to adjust), my model reduces to a standard neo-
classical MP model. However, with the Nash-bargaining equilibrium wage proportional to
technology At, a positive technology shock leaves the unemployment rate unchanged because
the wage increase absorbs all of the surplus and leaves the rms prot unchanged. This prop-
erty is not satisfactory as it is at odds with the search literature that views unemployment
uctuations as originating mainly in labor productivity changes (e.g. Shimer, 2005a).
In order to be consistent with the MP model, I assume that the market wage lags technology
so that the rms surplus increases temporarily following a positive technology shock. A number
of explanations has been advanced to motivate the assumption that real wages are rigid and
23This system has a unique solution provided that 1   q () (   1) (1 (1 ))

> 0 and b is a constant
fraction of wage payments. These conditions will be veried by the parameters chosen in the calibration.
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adjust slowly to technology changes.24 Without being explicit about the specic source of real
wage rigidity, I choose a simple partial adjustment model for ln

wt
At

:25
ln

wt
At

= $: ln

wnbt
At

+ (1 $) ln

wt 1
At 1

(12)
where wnbt is the long run equilibrium wage dened previously.
4.3 Log-linearized equilibrium dynamics
I now consider the more general case where  6= 0. To analyze the behavior of the economy
with real wage rigidity and costly price adjustment, I log-linearize around the (zero-ination)
long run equilibrium.
Since rms are homogenous, I can drop the i index from the equations, and by log-linearizing
the job posting condition (8), I get
c
q()
^t = Et

^t+1 +
c(1  )
q()
^t+1

+
c
q()
Et (y^t   y^t+1) (13)
with the average value of a marginal worker ^t given by
^t = w^t +  (y^t   n^t) (14)
and where ^t = ln
 
t


, n^t = ln
 
nt
n

and y^t = ln

Yt=At
y

are the log-deviations of rescaled
variables from their long-run equilibrium values.
Log-linearizing the price setting condition (11) yields the standard New-Keynesian Phillips
curve
t = s^t + Ett+1 (15)
with  = " 1 :The rms real marginal cost s^t given by
s^t = w^t + (   1) (y^t   n^t) (16)
As I discussed previously, rmsreal marginal costs are decreasing in the level of employment,
and the interaction of nominal frictions and hiring frictions generates a propagation mechanism
absent from New-Keynesian models without hiring frictions.
24See Pissarides (1987), Phelps (1994), Ball and Mo¢ tt (2002) or Hall (2005).
25Blanchard and Gali (2005) or Cristo¤el and Linzert (2005) follow a similar approach to introduce real wage
rigidity.
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Finally, the law of motion for the wage (12) becomes
w^t = $:w^
nb
t + (1 $)w^t 1   (1 $)"at (17)
with w^t = ln

wmt =At
w

the log-deviation of the rescaled wage from its long run equilibrium
value and w^nbt = ln

wmt =At
w

the log-linearized Nash-bargaining wage given by
w^NBt = c^t + !yy^t   !nn^t
with !y = 1(1 (1 )b0)whe
y
n + (1  )2+h1+hhh1+hy   (1  (1  )b0)
whe

and !n = 1(1 (1 )b0)whe
 
 yn + (1  )hh1+hy   (1  (1  )b0) w
he


:
Log-linearizing the rst-order conditions for the household and denoting m^t = ln

Mt=PtAt
(M=P )

the log-deviation of real rescaled money from its constant value in the zero-ination equilibrium,
I get y^t = Ety^t+1   (^{t   Ett+1) and m^t = y^t   i{^t with {^t = ln

1+it
1+i

:
Finally, the log-linearized law of motion for employment can be written
n^t+1 = (1    q())n^t + 1  n
n
(1  ):q()^t.
4.4 A simpler framework
4.4.1 Three simplifying assumptions
Albeit relatively simple, these equations are di¢ cult to interpret because of the behavior of the
real wage. I now make three simplifying assumptions that allow me to study the properties of
the model analytically and derive some closed form solutions.26 First, I assume that the money
growth rate exhibits no persistence, i.e. m = 0. This implies a constant nominal interest rate
so that m^t = y^t. Second, I assume that rms are risk-neutral. This does not change the main
conclusions of the model but makes analytical expressions much simpler as the vacancy posting
condition becomes
c
q()
^t = Et

^t+1 +
c(1  )
q()
^t+1

: (18)
My last simplication is less innocent: I assume that the exible wage towards which the
equilibrium market wage converges is not the Nash bargained wage anymore but a constant
value independent of labor market conditions and simply proportional to technology. More
26 In addition, they allow me to show analytically that, in the benchmark case without costly price adjustment,
my model is consistent with the prediction of the standard MP model that an increase in productivity decreases
unemployment: A positive technology shock will decrease unemployment in the short run but as the real market
wage ultimately adjusts to any technology level, unemployment converges back to its long run equilibrium level.
I leave the proof for the Appendix.
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specically, the market wage wt converges to w
At, the Nash-bargaining outcome of the rep-
resentative match in a zero-ination economy, and satises the law of motion
ln

wt
At

= $: ln

wAt
At

+ (1 $) ln

wt 1
At 1

(19)
so that the log-linearized law of motion (17) simplies to
w^ = (1 $)w^t 1   (1 $)"at : (20)
This contract could just as well be an equilibrium. It will satisfy both parties and will not
produce ine¢ cient separation as long as it remains within the bargaining set; i.e. as long as
Wt   Ut > 0 and Jt > 0. And this will be the case for small enough uctuations around
the zero-ination equilibrium. This market wage will not respond to small aggregate demand
disturbances (such as monetary policy shocks) since they have no long-run impact but will
converge to the long run equilibrium wage wAt (which does not, by denition, respond to
short run demand disturbances).27 However it will adjust to technological change. Otherwise
the bargaining set would eventually be above or below any constant wage and that wage could
no longer be an equilibrium. In addition, this real wage specication has the merit of being
consistent with the empirical evidence from Edge, Laubach and Williams (2003) who show
that the real wage responds progressively to technology shocks but is virtually insensitive to
monetary policy shocks.
This last simplication is very similar in spirit to Halls (2005) wage norm. Hall assumes
that productivity is the product of two components, a slow moving trend and a mean-reverting
process, but that the wage norm adjusts only to the trend component. Here this follows from
the existence of two di¤erent disturbances: demand shocks (with a temporary impact on
productivity) and technology shocks (with a permanent impact). The market wage, or wage
norm, adjusts to permanent but not to temporary changes in productivity.
4.4.2 Towards a traditional Phillips curve
Standard New-Keynesian models abstract from labor market imperfections and unemployment.
As a result, they are ill equipped to study any relationship linking unemployment to ination.
Thanks to the previous simplifying assumptions, I now show that a search model with costly
price adjustment can deliver a traditional Phillips curve linking ination to unemployment.
Combining the job posing condition (14) and (16), we can express ^t as a function of s^t
27The insensitivity of the market wage to monetary policy shocks can be justied by assuming a cost to wage
negotiations that is not worth incurring for small and transitory disturbances.
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and w^t
^t =
 
   1 s^t  
1
   1 w^t (21)
With costly price adjustment, there is a positive comovement between the ow value of a
marginal worker and the rms real marginal cost. Since the former drives unemployment
uctuations and the latter ination, a relation between ination and unemployment emerges.
In fact, with a little algebra left for the Appendix, I can rewrite the New-Keynesian Phillips
curve as
t = s^t + ^t + ~ww^t (22)
where  =
c(1 )
q() > 0 and ~w =
(1 $)
(1 (1 $))  0.
Ination can now be expressed as a function of current variables only. Notably, it depends
on current real marginal cost and current labor market tightness. Higher labor market tightness
raises the cost of hiring and reduces the rms future desired employment. But with a lower
level of future employment, future marginal costs are higher. The rm anticipates this and
raises its price. Hence, ination is positively related to labor market tightness. Ination
depends also on the market wage through ~w. ~w captures the impact of real wage rigidities
on future marginal costs and thus ination. Without real wage rigidity (~w = 0), the wage
immediately adjusts to any technology movement and has no impact on future marginal costs
and ination. With real wage rigidity (~w > 0), the wage lags technology and has an impact
on future marginal costs.
Finally, using the log-linearized rst-order conditions for the household and the fact that
labor market tightness is related to unemployment through the law of motion for employment, I
can rewrite the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (22) as a standard Phillips curve linking ination
to unemployment
t =  uu^t+1   uu^t + m"mt   a( cb)"at + ww^t 1 + mm^t 1 (23)
with u, u, w, and m some positive constants, a( cb) = w  (  1)(
cb 1)
1+(  1) , u^t the deviation
of the unemployment rate from its long run value and m^t = ln

Mt=PtAt
(M=P )

; the log-deviation
of real rescaled money from its constant value in the zero-ination equilibrium.28 w has a
similar interpretation as ~w but it captures the impact of real wage rigidities on current and
future real marginal costs: w = 0 when real wages adjust immediately to technology changes,
and w > 0 otherwise.
This equation is the main theoretical result of this New-Keynesian model with hiring fric-
tions and calls for a couple of remarks. First, despite the negative contemporaneous relation
28See the Appendix for details of the derivation.
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between ination and unemployment, this Phillips curve is New-Keynesian. Ination expec-
tations are still forward-looking, but the sum of expected future real marginal costs can be
written as a function of current unemployment and change in unemployment.
Second, as rst emphasized by Blanchard and Galí (2005, 2006), the combination of real
wage rigidity and price stickiness creates a trade-o¤ between ination and unemployment
absent in the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. The term  "at in (23) may remind the reader
of the cost-push term added to New-Keynesian models to restore the ination-unemployment
trade-o¤.
Starting from an equilibrium with no ination and constant unemployment (8 j < t;
"aj = "
m
j = 0 so that u^t = 0; m^t 1 = 0 and w^t 1 = 0), let us consider the impact of an
unexpected negative technology shock "at < 0. At date t, the Phillips curve can be written
t =  uu^t+1 + m"mt   a( cb)"at . The responses of ination and unemployment depend on
the central bank reaction  cb and the degree of real wage rigidity. With exible wages (w = 0),
the central bank can keep ination constant (t = 0) by accommodating the technology shock
with  cb = 1 so that a( cb) = 0. With m^t = ( cb   1)"at = 0, real money balances (i.e.
aggregate demand) are unchanged, and unemployment stays constant as well. With rigid
wages however, w > 0 and the rms real marginal costs are higher at date t and in future
dates, as it takes time for the market wage to adjust. To o¤set this increase in current
and future marginal costs, the central bank needs to overaccommodate the shock by setting
a(
cb) = 0, i.e.  cb = 1 + (1+~w)(1 $)(  1) > 1. But this decreases the real money supply
since m^t = ( cb   1)"at < 0 and leads to a contraction in demand that will increase future
unemployment. Hence, the central bank faces a trade-o¤ between ination and unemployment.
5 Confronting the model with the data
In this section, I study whether a calibrated version of the model can account for the impulse
responses to technology and non-technology shocks, as well as quantitatively explain the sign
ip of .
5.1 Calibration
First, I discuss the calibration of the parameters of the model. Consistent with the data used
in Section 2, I assume a quarterly frequency for the model. I set the quarterly discount factor
 to 0:99: I assume that the markup of prices over marginal costs is on average 10 percent.
This amounts to setting " equal to 11. To pick a value for the price adjustment cost parameter
 and the Phillips curve coe¢ cient , I exploit the mapping between my model with costly
price adjustment and the model with Calvo type price setting described in the Appendix.
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Both models imply the same linearized New-Keynesian Phillips curve but in the latter,  is
determined by the frequency of price adjustment. When, as consistent with recent micro
estimates (Bils and Klenow, 2004), rms reset their price every 2 quarters,  takes the value
0:10, so I choose  = 100 to match : I set the growth rate of technology (and money supply) to
a = 0:5% a quarter so that the economy is growing by 2% on average each year. I use a money
growth autocorrelation parameter m of 0:6, in line with the rst autocorrelations of M1 and
M2 growth in the US. Turning to the labor market, I set the matching function elasticity to
 = 0:4 as measured by Blanchard and Diamond (1994). The scale parameter of the matching
functions m0 is chosen such that, as reported in den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), a
rm lls a vacancy with probability q() = 0:7 and a worker nds a job with probability
q() = 0:45.29 Following Shimer (2005a), the separation rate is 10% so jobs last for about
2.5 years on average. Unemployment benets are paid a constant fraction of the long-run
equilibrium wage, and the income replacement ratio is set to 40% of mean income so that
b = 0:4whe. By setting the returns to e¢ cient labor  to 0:64, I x  , the elasticity of the
rms cost function with respect to demand, to 1:56. I set the degree of real wage rigidity $
to 0:75, implying an average duration of real wages of one year. Pencavel (1986) reports micro
estimates of hours per week elasticity between 0 and 0:5, and I choose a mid-range value of 0:2
with h = 5. The last two variables to specify are e, i.e. ' = 

1 + h1+e

the short run scale
parameter of the production function, and  cb the degree of monetary policy accommodation.
As in Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005), I choose them by tting the simulated
impulse responses to the empirical ones. The estimated ' = 1:30 is consistent with Basu and
Kimballs (1997) evidence that ' ranges from 1:1 to 1:4. With an estimated  cb of  0:43, the
central bank contracts the money supply when technology increases. A negative value for  cb
is relatively surprising given that central banks should accommodate technology shocks, not
contract the money supply. But this is not implausible given the di¢ culty central banks have
in estimating the relevant output gap. As Galí and Rabanal (2005) argue, the Taylor rule
originally proposed by Taylor (1993) was it = t + yyt in which the central bank responds
to the output gap (i.e. deviation from trend), not the real marginal cost, di¢ cult to observe
for the policy maker. Positive technology shocks may have been misinterpreted as a deviation
from trend that should be avoided to keep ination at bay, leading the central bank to pursue
a contractionary policy.30
29Shimer (2005b) reports a higher value q() = 0:6 but the main results do not rely on this particular choice
of calibration.
30 Indeed, Orphanides (2002) claims that the Great Ination of the 1970s "could be attributed to [...] an
adverse shift in the natural rate of unemployment that could not have been expected to be correctly assessed
for some time."
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5.2 Impulse response functions
The dotted lines in Figure 13 and 14 show the simulated impulse response functions of pro-
ductivity, unemployment, output and ination to a technology and a monetary policy shock
alongside the empirical impulse responses reported in Section 2.
Following a positive technology shock, real money balances (i.e. aggregate demand) do not
increase as much as productivity because prices are costly to adjust and because the central
bank does not fully accommodate the shock. As a result, aggregate demand is sticky in the
short run. Being more productive, rms initially meet their demand by decreasing hours and
e¤ort since employment is a state variable. Measured labor productivity (i.e. output per hour)
undershoots its new long run level because of short run increasing returns to hours. With
shorter hours and lower e¤ort, the value of a marginal worker (i.e. the reduction in labor costs
achieved with an extra worker) goes down, rms post fewer vacancies, and unemployment
increases. As prices adjust to the new productivity level, both labor margins return to their
long run values.
Following a positive monetary policy shock, rms need to increase their labor input in order
to satisfy demand. Again, since they must rst rely on the intensive margin, measured labor
productivity initially increases as hours and e¤ort increase. With higher hours and e¤ort, the
value of a marginal worker goes up, rms post more vacancies and unemployment goes down.
As prices adjust to the new money supply level, both labor margins return slowly to their long
run values.
Apart from a slight departure from the 95% condence interval for the unemployment
response, the model is remarkably successful at matching the empirical responses. Moreover,
the model output response to a technology shock is similar to the empirical response reported
by Galí (1999).
5.3 The sign switch of 
In Section 2, I argue that two events could be responsible for the large increase in  in the
mid-80s: (a) a decline in the relative importance (or volatility) of non-technology shocks versus
technology shocks, and (b) a structural change in the transmission mechanism of shocks. In
this subsection, I test whether they can quantitatively explain the magnitude of the change in
.
5.3.1 Changes in the volatility of shocks
In Section 2, I document a large drop in the volatility of non-technology shocks relative to
technology shocks and present some evidence suggesting that changes in the relative size of
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technology and non-technology shocks drive uctuations in . To explore whether the volatility
movements around 1980 are quantitatively large enough to explain the sign ip of , I use
my calibrated model to simulate the impact of a drop in the volatility of aggregate demand
shocks on the correlation between productivity and unemployment. I generate unemployment
and productivity series using technology and monetary innovations with standard deviations
following step functions that mimic the volatility movements that occurred around 1980. Figure
10 depicts the step functions used in the simulation. The validity of this approach is subject
to the correct identication and separation of technology and non-technology shocks. There
is reassuring evidence (see Galí and Rabanal (2004)) that technology shocks are correctly
identied by long run restrictions but, since I emphasize the role played by aggregate demand
shocks, I also look at the Romer and Romer (2004) monetary shocks. Those shocks are
identied with a di¤erent method, but we can see in Figure 15 that, notwithstanding the large
volatility increase in the late 70s, their volatility in 1975 is twice as high as that in 1990, a
volatility drop similar to the one used in the simulation.
I simulate 50 years of data for unemployment and productivity. After ltering the (non-
stationary) productivity series, I can calculate ^10, the simulated 10-year rolling correlation
between simulated productivity and unemployment. I repeat this exercise 5000 times to obtain
the empirical distribution of ^10. As shown in Figure 16, ^10 increases by around 0:3 and explain
less than 50% of the total increase in ~10. In addition, ~10 overestimates ~10 until 1980 and
underestimates ~10 afterwards lying only marginally inside the 95% condence interval.
31 If a
drop in aggregate demand volatility seems to be part of the story, something else contributed
to the sign switch in the mid 80s.
5.3.2 Structural changes
In Section 2, I argue that two structural changes could be responsible for the large movement
in  in the mid-80s: (a) the central bank became more accommodating after 1984, and (b) a
decline in the procyclicality of measured labor productivity declined after 1984. In my model,
a decrease in the procyclicality of productivity appears as a decrease in ', the short run returns
to hours. Explicitly modeling a decrease in ' is beyond the scope of the model but it would
still be interesting to test if the decrease in the procyclicality of productivity is enough to
account for the sign ip of . I estimate the value of ' and  cb for each sub-sample, and I nd
that ' decreased from 1:6 to 1:05 between 1948-1983 and 1984-2005, while  cb increased from
 0:6 to  0:2.
31Since the model implies no response of unemployment on impact (employment is a state variable), I dene
^  corr(U^t+1; y^t
h^t
): To be consistent, I compare ^ to ~  corr(Ut+1; ytht ) instead of   corr(Ut;
yt
ht
). This does
not change any of the conclusions since  and ~ are very similar up to a vertical translation.
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To study the impact of better monetary policy and less procyclical productivity on , I
proceed as previously and simulate 50 years of data for unemployment and productivity but
allowing for di¤erent ' and  cb over the two sub-periods as well as a drop in the volatility of
monetary policy shocks. As shown in Figure 17, ^10 increases this time from around  0:5 to
0:1, lies comfortably within the 95% condence interval and does not over overestimate ~10
before the 80s.
A remaining question is why productivity became less procyclical after 1984. A possible
answer lies with a change in the behavior of inventories. The covariance between inventory
investment and sales switched sign in 1984 and turned from positive to negative. A negative
covariance means that inventories are used to smooth production uctuations. To satisfy
demand in the short run, rms use their inventories and do not rely as much on the intensive
labor margin. With short run increasing returns to hours, productivity is less procyclical. On
the other hand, with a positive covariance, inventory investment increases with sales, and in
the short run, rms use their intensive margin to satisfy demand and increase inventories.
Productivity is more procyclical. Various explanations have been proposed to explain this
change in the covariance. Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) argue that the late 70s
and early 80s were times of dramatic innovations in manufacturing technology and inventory
management. This has facilitated using inventories to smooth production. Looking at the
automobile industry, Ramey and Vine (2004) propose a di¤erent explanation after showing
that the serial correlation of sales decreased after 1984. With more transitory shocks, rms
can more easily allow for deviations from their desired inventory-sales ratio since they know
that deviations will be short-lived. Again, this facilitates the use of inventories to smooth
production.
6 Conclusion
By studying the joint behavior of labor productivity and unemployment before and after the
beginning of the Great Moderation, I uncover a large and swift increase in the unemployment-
productivity correlation that poses a puzzle to search models of unemployment. From negative,
the correlation turned positive in the mid 80s, while standard search models imply a negative
correlation. Further, using long run restrictions to identify technological innovations, I nd
that, contrary to what search models imply, a positive technology shock increases unemploy-
ment in the short run.
I present a model with hiring frictions, variable e¤ort and costly price adjustment that
can rationalize the empirical observations. In this framework, positive technology shocks tem-
porarily raise unemployment because with costly price adjustment, aggregate demand does
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not increase as much as productivity, and rms use less labor. The correlation between un-
employment and productivity, , is positive. On the other hand, positive aggregate demand
disturbances decrease unemployment and increase productivity temporarily because rms in-
crease workerse¤ort to satisfy demand in the short run. As a result,  is negative. I document
two new facts about the Great Moderation that can account for the large and swift increase
in  in the mid 80s: (a) an increase in the size of technology shocks relative to other shocks,
and (b) a decline in the procyclicality of measured productivity since the mid 80s. Thanks to
a calibrated version of the model, I simulate the impact of these two events and nd that they
quantitatively explain the sign switch of . I suspect that the decrease in the procyclicality
of labor productivity after 1984 is linked to a change in inventory management after 1984 but
a precise examination would require a theoretical integration of capacity utilization decisions
(such as workerse¤ort) and inventory decisions, and I leave this task for future research.
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Appendix:
Estimation of technology and non-technology shocks
I am interested in estimating the system 
xt
ut
!
= C(L)
 
"at
"dt
!
= C(L)"t (24)
where xt is labor productivity dened as output per hours, ut unemployment, C(L) an in-
vertible matrix polynomial and "t the vector of structural orthogonal innovations comprised of
"at technology shocks and "
d
t non-technology shocks. I use the estimation method of Shapiro
and Watson (1988) and Francis and Ramey (2003) to allow for time-varying variance of the
structural innovations.
Without loss of generality, (24) can be written
xt =
pX
j=1
xx;jxt j +
pX
j=0
~xu;jut j + "
a
t
ut =
pX
j=1
uu;jut j +
pX
j=1
ux;jxt j + "
a
t + "
m
t
As discussed in Shapiro and Watson (1988), imposing the long run restriction that only tech-
nology shocks have a permanent e¤ect on xt is equivalent to restricting the variable ut to enter
the rst equation in di¤erences. Consequently, the system reduces to
xt =
pX
j=1
xx;jxt j +
p 1X
j=0
xu;jut j + "
a
t (25)
ut =
pX
j=1
uu;jut j +
pX
j=1
ux;jxt j + "
a
t + "
m
t (26)
Since ut j is correlated with "at , equation (25) must be estimated with instrumental variables.
I use lags 1 to p = 4 of xt and ut as instruments. The residual from this IV regression is the
estimated technology shock "^at . The second equation can be identied by OLS but using "^
a
t in
place of "at . Finally to allow for time-varying variance of the structural innovations (or more
generally heteroskedasticity), I follow Francis and Ramey (2003) and estimate both equations
jointly using GMM. That way, I can estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates
and generate the standard error bands for the impulse response functions. The error bands
are derived by generating random vectors from a multivariate normal distribution with mean
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equal to the coe¢ cient estimates and variance-covariance matrix equal to the estimated one,
and then calculating the impulse response functions.
Rewriting the New-Keynesian Phillips curve as a classic Phillips curve
I want to rewrite the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (15) as a function of current variables only.
Iterating (15) forward and replacing real marginal cost with (21), I can express ination as
a function of current marginal cost, future expected values of a marginal worker, and future
market wages:
t = s^t + Et
1X
j=1
j s^t+j = s^t + 
   1
 
Et
1X
j=1
j^t+j +

 
Et
1X
j=1
jw^t+j (27)
Iterating (18) forward and using the approximation (1   )ea =  + o() '  for  and a
close to zero, I can rewrite the discounted sum of expected future values of a marginal worker
as a function of current labor market tightness
Et
1X
j=1
j^t+j ' Et
NX
j=1
j^t+j (28)
' Et
NX
j=1
j (ea(1  ))j 1 ^t+j
' Et
1X
j=1
j (ea(1  ))j 1 ^t+j =
c
q()
^t
since N ^t+N and 
N (ea(1  ))N 1 ^t+N become very small for N large enough. Finally,
using the law of motion for the market wage (20), I get
Et
1X
j=1
jw^t+j =
(1 $)
1  (1 $) w^t: (29)
Rewriting the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (27) with (28) and (29), I obtain
t = s^t + ^t + ~ww^t
where  =
c(1 )
q() > 0 and ~w =
(1 $)
(1 (1 $))  0.
Log-linearizing the rst-order conditions for the household and denoting m^t = ln

Mt=PtAt
(M=P )

the log-deviation of real rescaled money from its constant value in the zero-ination equilibrium,
I get y^t = Ety^t+1 + Ett+1 and m^t = y^t:
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Finally, the log-linearized law of motion for employment can be written
n^t+1 = (1    q())n^t + 1  n
n
(1  ):q()^t. (30)
Combining the rms rst order-conditions with the households conditions and using the law
of motion for employment, I can rewrite the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (22) as a standard
Phillips curve linking ination to unemployment. Denoting u^t = ut   u deviations of the
unemployment rate from its long run value, labor market tightness can be related to the
unemployment rate using the approximation u^t =  n^t and the employment dynamics equation
(30)
^t =
 n
(1  n)(1  )q() [u^t+1 + (+ q()) u^t]
so that with (16), I obtain the Phillips curve relation
t =  uu^t+1   uu^t + m"mt  

w    (   1)(
cb   1)
1 + (   1)

"at + ww^t 1 + mm^t 1
with u = 
n

(1 )
(1+(  1))(1 n)(1 )q() > 0, u = 
 
u
 (+ q()) +    1

> 0,
w = 
(1+~w)(1 $)
1+(  1) > 0, and m =
(  1)
1+(  1) > 0:
An equivalent model with Calvo price setting
In this section, I describe a model similar to the one presented on Section 3 but with the
assumption of Calvo price setting instead of costly price adjustment. Specically, rms can
only reset their price (at no cost) at random dates, and each period a fraction  of randomly
selected rms cannot reset its price.
I now show that such a model delivers similar rst-order conditions as well as the same
log-linearized New-Keynesian Phillips curve. However, a complication arises because Calvo
price setting introduces heterogeneity amongst rms. Indeed, with Calvo-type price stickiness,
the Nash-bargaining match-specic wage paid to each worker becomes rm-specic, and the
workers opportunity cost of accepting a job depends on the pricing decisions of all other rms.
This complicates greatly the determination of the equilibrium wage and the rest of the analysis,
and this is the main reason why I preferred the assumption of costly price adjustment to Calvo
price setting in the workhorse model.
However, recall that rms take the wage as given when making their price or hiring deci-
sions. As a result, apart from the determination of the wage, the rst-order conditions remain
similar with the households problem unchanged and the rms problem only slightly modied.
Given the market wage and aggregate price level, rm i will choose a sequence of price fPitg
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and vacancies fvitg to maximize the expected present discounted value of future prots subject
to the demand constraint, the Calvo price setting rule, the hours/e¤ort choice and the law of
motion for employment. Formally, the rm maximizes its value
Et
X
j
j

Pi;t+j
Pt+j
ydi;t+j   ni;t+jhi;t+jei;t+jwt   cAtvi;t+j

subject to the hours/e¤ort decision
eit = e0h
h
1+e
it
the demand constraint
ydit = Atnith
'
it = (
Pi;t
Pt
) "Yt
and the law of motion for employment
nit+1 = (1  )nit + q(t)vit:
The job posting condition is unchanged and takes the form
ct
q(t)
= Ett+1

it+1 +
ct+1
q(t+1)
(1  )

(31)
where it, the shadow value of a marginal worker, can be written as
it =  
@it
@nit
= (   1)wthiteit = (   1)wt

ydit
Atnit
 
.
However, with Calvo-type price setting, rms can only reset their price at random dates and
each period a fraction  of randomly selected rms cannot reset its price. As a result, the
optimal price setting rule is di¤erent, and a rm resetting its price at date t will satisfy the
standard Calvo price setting condition:
Et
1X
j=0
jj

P it
Pt+j
  sit+j

Yt+jP
"
t+j = 0 (32)
where the optimal mark-up is  = "" 1 and the rms real marginal cost
sit =
@it
@yit
=  
wt
At

ydit
Atnit
  1
The rm will choose a price P it that is, in expected terms, a constant mark-up  over its real
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marginal cost for the expected lifetime of the price.
To derive the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, I log-linearize around the zero ination equilib-
rium. However, because of rmsex-post heterogeneity, the derivation is not as straightforward,
and I follow Woodfords (2004) similar treatment of endogenous capital in a New-Keynesian
model with Calvo price rigidity. In my case, employment is the state variable and plays the
role of capital in Woodfords model. I start by log-linearizing the rst-order conditions (31)
and (32) around the zero-ination equilibrium. For any t > 0, the vacancy posting condition
becomes
c
q()
^t = Et

^it+1 +
c(1  )
q()
^t+1

+
c
q()
Et (y^t   y^t+1) (33)
with the value of a marginal worker ^it given by
^it+1 = w^
n
t+1 +  (y^it+1   n^it+1)
and the price-setting condition becomes
1X
k=0
()kE^it [~pit+k   s^it+k] = 0 (34)
with
s^it+k = w^
n
t+k + (   1) (y^it+k   n^it+k): (35)
The notation E^it denotes an expectation conditional on the state of the world at date t but
integrating only over future states in which rm i has not reset its price since period t: ~pit 
log

Pit
Pt

is the rms relative price.
Denoting log prices by lower-case letters and pit the optimal (log) price for rm i at t, the
demand curve for rm i at date t + 1 can be written y^it+1 = y^t+1   "(pit   pt+1) if it cannot
reset its price at t+ 1 and y^it+1 = y^t+1   "(pit+1   pt+1) if it can reset its price.
Averaging across all rms, I get
1Z
0
y^it+1di = y^t+1   "
24( 1Z
0
pitdi  pt+1) + (1  )(
1Z
0
pit+1di  pt+1)
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= y^t+1   "

(pt   pt+1) + (1  )(pt+1   pt+1)

(36)
where pt+1 =
1Z
0
pit+1di is the average price chosen by all price setters at date t+ 1.
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With Calvo price-setting, I can write
pt+1 =
 
(1  )p1 "t+1 + p1 "t
 1
1 "
or
1 = (1  )

pt+1
pt+1
1 "
+ 

pt
pt+1
1 "
:
Log-linearizing around the zero-ination equilibrium gives  (pt+1 pt) = (1 )(pt+1 pt+1)
and combining with (36) gives
1Z
0
y^it+1di = y^t+1. Further,
1Z
0
n^itdi = n^t.
Averaging (35) across all rms. I get s^t+k = w^mt+k +(   1) (y^t+k   n^t+k) so that I can rewrite
the real marginal cost as
s^it = s^t +
1  

( "~pit   ~nit) (37)
where ~nit = nit   nt is the relative employment of rm i.
Using that E^it ~pit+k = pit   Etpt+k and (37) in (35) yields
1 + "
1  


pit = (1  )
1X
k=0
()kE^it

s^t+k +

1 + "
1  


pt+k   1  

~nit+k

(38)
Averaging the shadow value of a marginal worker gives
^t = w^
n
t +  (y^t   n^t)
so that by subtracting (33) from its average, I get
~nit+1 = Et(y^it+1   y^t+1) (39)
=  "Et

(pit   pt+1) + (1  )(pit+1   pt+1

=  "~pit   "(1  )(pit+1   pt+1)
since pt+1 = pt + (1  )pt+1.
The rms pricing decision depends on its employment level and the economys aggregate state.
But to a rst order, the log-linearized equations are linear so that the di¤erence between pit and
pt , the average price chosen by all price setters, is independent from the economys aggregate
state and depends only on the relative level of employment nit   nt = ~nit. So as in Woodford
(2004), I guess that the rms pricing decision takes the form
pit   pt =  ~nit (40)
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with  a constant to be determined. Hence, (33) becomes
~nit+1 =
 "
1  "(1  ) ~pit =  f()~pit
Since this was shown for any t > 0, I also get ~nit+k =  f()~pit+k 1, 8k > 0 so that I can
rewrite (38) as
pit = (1  )
1X
k=0
()kE^it [s^t+k + pt+k]  (1  )
1  

~nit (41)
with  =
 
1 + "1     1  f()

.
Subtracting (41) from its average, I obtain
(pit   pt ) =  (1  )
1  

~nit: (42)
This equation is of the conjectured form (40) if and only if  satises
 =
(1  )1 
1 + "1     1  f()
: (43)
Finally, averaging (41) and using t = 1  (p

t  pt), I obtain the New-Keynesian Phillips curve
t = :s^t + Ett+1
with  = (1 )(1 ) :
Hence, a model with a Calvo price setting mechanism is described by the same log-linearized
rst-order conditions as a model with costly price adjustment, and the determination and
behavior of the real wage (or wages if heterogenous rms pay di¤erent wages) is the only
di¤erence.
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Table 1. Correlation Estimates
1948-1984 1985-2005
ρU,Y/H -0.31**
(0.11)
0.40**
(0.20)
ρV,Y/H 0.34**
(0.14)
-0.18
(0.17)
Note: Table 1 reports estimates of the correlation between unemployment and labor productivity over
1948:Q1-1984:Q4 and 1985:Q1-2005:Q4, and between vacancies and labor productivity over 1951:Q1-
1984:Q4 and 1985:Q1-2005:Q4. All series are detrended with an HP-filter with smoothing parameter
1600. Standard-errors are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated by one asterisk (10-percent
level) or two asterisks (5-percent level).
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Figure 1: Unemployment and labor productivity (output per hour) over 1948-2005. The quar-
terly series are detrended with an HP-lter =1600 and annualized for clarity of exposition.
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Figure 2: 10-year rolling correlation (unemployment,output per hour) over 1948-2005.
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Figure 3: Empirical Cross-Correlogram of Output per Hour and Unemployment over 1948-1984
(background) and 1985-2005 (foreground).
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Figure 4:  and the10-year rolling correlation (employment,output per hour) over 1951-2005.
Employment is measure in millions of workers and is detrended with an HP-lter ( = 1600).
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Figure 5:  and the 10-year rolling correlation (vacancies,output per hour) over 1951-2005.
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Figure 6:  and the10-year rolling correlation (unemployment,TFP) over 1948-2000. TFP is
adjusted for capacity utilization and taken from Beaudry and Portier (2006).
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions to technology and non-technology shocks. Dashed lines
represent the 95% condence interval.
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions to technology and non-technology shocks. Productivity
is measured with TFP unadjusted for capacity utilization. Dashed lines represent the 95%
condence interval.
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Figure 9: Impulse response functions to technology and non-technology shocks. Productivity is
measured with TFP adjusted for capacity utilization. Dashed lines represent the 95% condence
interval.
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Figure 10: 5-year rolling standard-deviation of technology and non-technology shocks and step
functions approximating the standard deviations. Both standard deviations are normalized to
one for ease of comparison, 1948-2005.
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Figure 11: 5-year rolling correlation (unemployment,output per hour) and ratio of the 5-year
rolling standard deviation of technology shocks to the 5-year rolling standard deviation of
non-technology shocks. Deviations from the mean, 1948-2005.
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Figure 12: Impulse response functions to technology and non-technology shocks. Solid lines
show estimates for 1948-1983 and dashed lines for 1984-2005. Solid circles indicate that the
response is signicant at the 5% level and open circles at the 10% level.
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Figure 13: Model (dotted line) and Empirical (plain line) impulse response functions to a
technology shock. Dashed lines represent the 95% condence interval.
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Figure 14: Model (dotted line) and Empirical (plain line) impulse response functions to a
non-technology shock. Dashed lines represent the 95% condence interval.
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Figure 15: 5-year rolling standard-deviation of Romer and Romer monetary shocks. 1969:Q1-
1996:Q4.
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Figure 16: Simulation of  with volatility drop after 1984. (dashed lines represent the 95%
condence interval)
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Figure 17: Simulation of  with volatility drop and structural change after 1984. (dashed lines
represent the 95% condence interval)
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